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Comments
GASOLINE MARKETING PRACTICES AND "MEETING
COMPETITION" UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT:
MARYLAND'S RESPONSE TO DIRECT RETAIL
MARKETING BY OIL COMPANIES
INTRODUCTION

The energy shortage of 1973 focused public attention on the petroleum
industry. Foreseeing the possibility that shortages would continue to occur,
the Maryland General Assembly enacted a statute in 1974, amended in
1975,1 designed to equalize the impact of decreased gasoline supplies among
gasoline retail dealers. Major national oil companies promptly challenged
the statute on constitutional and federal preemption grounds. In Governor of
Maryland v. Exxon Corporation,2 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held

that the statute was constitutional and was not preempted by either the
Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 19733 or the RobinsonPatman Act.4 This Note will outline the Exxon decision, focusing primarily
on the holding that, as a matter of law, the Maryland statute was not
preempted by the Robinson-Patman Act. After evaluating the apparent
conflict among the Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and the Federal
Trade Commission regarding the construction of the "meeting competition"
defense in the federal anti-price discrimination statute, the position adopted
by the Court of Appeals will be analyzed. The discussion will conclude that
the Maryland interpretation is accurate and solidly based on national
antitrust policy.
At Governor Mandel's request, the Comptroller of the Treasury
conducted a study during the summer of 1973 on the effects of the oil
shortage on local gasoline markets. The study focused on the effects of
increased direct retailing by the large, vertically integrated oil companies on
other major types of marketing in Maryland.5 In past years, the twenty
largest oil companies typically have operated at the crude oil production,
transportation, refining, and wholesale marketing levels of the petroleum
industry.6 This involvement at the successive stages from production
through wholesaling is characterized as vertical integration. 7 However, in
recent years, both major and semi-major oil companies8 have exerted
1. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E (Cum. Supp. 1976).
2. 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102 (1977), prob. juris. noted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S.
Oct. 3, 1977).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 753 (Supp. III 1973).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
5. See 279 Md. at 420-21, 370 A.2d at 1108-09.
6. THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY 120 (4th ed. W. Adams 1971).
7. See, e.g., J. PATTERSON & F. ALLVINE, COMPETITION LTD.: THE MARKETING OF
GASOLINE 5 (1972) [hereinafter cited as COMPETITION LTD.].

8. For detailed discussions of the structure and practices of large, vertically
integrated oil companies, see J. BLAIR, THE CONTROL OF OIL (1976) [hereinafter cited
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increased control over the retail marketing of their products.9 The most
significant manifestation of this forward integration into retail marketing is
the trend toward converting company owned retail outlets ordinarily leased
to independent dealers into company owned and operated retail stations. 10
The ramifications of forward integration into marketing are important
because the existence of employee operated stations effectively precludes
application of antitrust laws regulating sales from distributors to dealers, 1
increases the unwillingness of large oil companies to supply gasoline to
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[hereinafter cited as HIGHWAY ROBBERY]; Note, Gasoline Marketing Divestiture
Statutes: A Preliminary Constitutionaland Economic Assessment, 28 VAND. L. REV.

1277 (1975) [hereinafter cited as Gasoline Marketing Divestiture Statutes].
9. In domestic marketing, integrated oil companies employ various methods to
control individual dealers:

short-term lease contracts, supervision by company

representatives, price discipline through strategically located company stations,
commission dealerships, price protection programs, rent manipulation, and pressure
to conform to advertised "specials." See, e.g., COMPETITION

LTD.,

supra note 7, at

46-48. For a description of such practices in operation, see Hearings Pursuant to S.
Res. 45 on a National Fuels and Energy Policy Study Before the Comm. on Interior
and Insular Affairs, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 7 (1973) (statement of Richard
Tubbs).
10. See, e.g., GasolineMarketing Divestiture Statutes, supra note 8, at 1290. This
trend was motivated largely by the need to increase profits at the marketing level and
by the desire to avoid new franchise laws that protected independent gasoline dealers
from oil company leasing terms that many consider oppressive. Id. at 1287-90. The
major oil companies suffered a drastic decline in domestic retail profits in the late
1960's and early 1970's, attributable in large part to successful competition by
independent marketers. THE CONTROL OF Oil, supra note 8, at 241-42. In addition, the
international companies, strongly dependent upon profits at the crude oil level of
operation, were seriously threatened by foreign expropriations and by the Arab
embargo. See, e.g., THE CONTROL OF OIL, supra note 8, at 220-30; N.Y. Times, May 27,
1973, §3, at 1, col. 1. Between August 31, 1970 and January 1, 1974, Arabian light
crude oil prices rose from $1.80 per barrel to $11.651 per barrel. HIGHWAY ROBBERY,
supra note 8, Table 4-1 at 53.
At the marketing level of the industry, oil companies began to lose some of
their power over their dealers. For example, the Maryland legislature enacted the
Gasoline Products Marketing Act, MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-301 to 308 (1975),
to prevent unfair control of independent gasoline dealers. Among other provisions, the
Act requires a distributor to disclose past gallonage to a prospective franchisee, allows
a dealer to cancel a marketing agreement within seven days of signing, prohibits a
distributor from setting a dealer's hours of business unless otherwise provided in the
franchise agreement, and forbids a distributor from exerting pressure on a dealer to
participate in promotion schemes. One particularly important provision requires that
a party give 90 days notice of intent not to renew a franchise. MD. COM. LAW CODE
ANN. § 11-304 (1975). See Becker v. Crown Central Petroleum Corp., 26 Md. App. 596,
614, 340 A.2d 324, 335, cert. denied, 276 Md. 738 (1975).
11. Antitrust laws regulating sales do not apply to intracompany transfers. See,
e.g., Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970) (unlawful to
discriminate in price between "purchasers"); Gasoline Marketing DivestitureStatutes,
supra note 8, at 1320-25.
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retail competitors, 2 and focuses the power of vertically integrated compan13
ies against the small, independent private-brand marketers.
The Comptroller's study showed that every type of independent outlet
had suffered greater shortages in 1973 than had company owned and
operated retail outlets. Four categories of gasoline stations were surveyed:
stations owned by major oil companies and leased to dealers, 14 independently owned stations that sold major brand supplies, unbranded stations,1 5
and oil company owned and operated stations. Results showed that only
company owned and operated stations experienced no shortage; stations not
retailing brand names received decreased supplies, as did independents and
16
major brand stations that were leased to dealers.
Responding to this study and following extensive public hearings, the
Maryland General Assembly added several provisions to the Motor Fuel
Inspection Law to prohibit forward integration into gasoline retailing and to
prevent suppliers from discriminating among gasoline dealers. 17 The statute
also attempts to equalize the impact of decreased gasoline supplies by
requiring that supplies be uniformly and equitably allocated to all Maryland

12. See, e.g., COMPETITION LTD., supra note 7, at 237-38; HIGHWAY ROBBERY,
supra note 8, at 17, 150; THE CONTROL OF OIL, supra note 8, at 249; Hearings Pursuant
to S. Res. 344, Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Comm. on the
Judiciary,91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 97 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 1970 Hearings];
Gasoline Marketing Divestiture Statutes, supra note 8, at 1291. See generally, Note,
The GasolineMarketing Structure and Refusals to Deal With Independent Dealers:A
Sherman Act Approach, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 465 (1974).
13. Private brand marketers are generally small, non-integrated, price-conscious
retailers. These gasoline dealers obtain supplies from the best available source, do not
advertise, and avoid expensive locations. See, e.g., COMPETITION LTD., supra note 7, at
237-38. This method of gasoline marketing is efficient and competitive; by the late
1960's and early 1970's the major oil companies had lost a substantial amount of sales
to the private marketers despite price wars and the tactic of introducing "secondary"
or "fighting" brands of gasoline into the market. THE CONTROL OF OIL, supra note 8,
at 237-42; HIGHWAY ROBBERY, supra note 8, at 42-46, 74. When gasoline supplies
became scarce in 1973, the oil companies focused the effects of the shortage on private
marketers; denial of supplies and the resulting price increases forced many private
brand retailers out of the market. COMPETITION LTD., supra note 7, at 176-77; THE
CONTROL OF OIL, supra note 8, at 246-60.
14. Traditionally, this form of retailing has been the most prevalent.
COMPETITION LTD., supra note 7, at 44.
15. This method of marketing gasoline is considered to represent a strong
competitive force. See COMPETITION LTD., supra note 7, at 74-102; note 13 supra. For a
discussion of the growth of private brand marketers, see THE CONTROL OF OIL, supra
note 8, at 237-40.
16. Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 421, 370 A.2d 1102, 1109, prob.
juris. noted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1977).
17. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(b)-(h) (Cum. Supp. 1976):
(b) After July 1, 1974, no producer or refiner of petroleum products shall
open a major brand, secondary brand or unbranded retail service station in
the State of Maryland, and operate it with company personnel, a subsidiary
company, commissioned agent, or under a contract with any person, firm, or
corporation, managing a service station on a fee arrangement with the
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retailers during times of shortage1 s In order to preserve competition and to
prevent independents from being forced out of business by discounts offered
by oil companies to their own outlets, 19 the statute makes price discrimination among dealers in the form of voluntary allowances unlawful.12 The
absolute prohibitions of the statute are tempered by provisions authorizing
the Comptroller to exercise discretion in the administration and enforcement
21
of the law.

producer or refiner. The station must be operated by a retail service station
dealer.
(c) After July 1, 1975, no producer or refiner of petroleum products shall
operate a major brand, secondary brand, or unbranded retail service station
in the State of Maryland, with company personnel, a subsidiary company,
commissioned agent, or under a contract with any person, firm, or corporation, managing a service station on a fee arrangement with the producer or
refiner. The station must be operated by a retail service station dealer.
(d) Every producer, refiner, or wholesaler of petroleum products
supplying gasoline and special fuels to retail service station dealers shall
extend all voluntary allowances uniformly to all retail service station dealers
supplied.
(e) Every producer, refiner, or wholesaler of petroleum products supplying gasoline and special fuels to retail service station dealers shall apply all
equipment rentals uniformly to all retail service station dealers supplied.
(f) Every producer, refiner, or wholesaler of petroleum products shall
apportion uniformly all gasoline and special fuels to all retail service station
dealers during periods of shortages on an equitable basis, and shall not
discriminate among the dealers in their allotments.
(g) The Comptroller may adopt rules or regulations defining the
circumstances in which a producer or refiner temporarily may operate a
previously dealer-operated station.
(h) The Comptroller may permit reasonable exceptions to the divestiture
dates specified by this section after considering all of the relevant facts and
reaching reasonable conclusions based upon those facts.
18. Id. § 157E(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
19. At the legislative hearings, evidence was presented by the Executive Branch
showing the existence of forward integration in Maryland as well as inequalities in
supply allocations and price allowances. Supporters of the act argued that the effect of
these developments would be to force the independent marketers out of the area. See
39 CONSUMER REPORTS 346-47 (April 1974). They warned that when this was
accomplished major oil companies would control the market, resulting in higher
consumer prices. Although such a situation is usually attractive to new competition
willing to offer the public lower prices, see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMics 492 (8th ed.
1970), it was argued that since the major oil companies control nearly 80% of the
petroleum supplies, new entries would be precluded by lack of access to products. See
COMPETITION LTD., supra note 7, at 10. The oil companies countered that the true
effect of the proposed statute would be to force discount marketers out of business
because they would be unable to compete without price allowances. In enacting the
bill, the legislature was persuaded that the Maryland gasoline market faced harmful
anticompetitive practices through forward integration and discriminatory pricing.
20. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
21. Id. §§ 157E(g) & (h) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
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22
Major national oil companies involved in direct retailing in Maryland
immediately challenged the statute on constitutional and federal preemption
grounds. The plaintiffs filed suit in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel
County seeking both a declaratory judgment that the statute was
unconstitutional and injunctive relief prohibiting its enforcement. Focusing
on the divestment provisions, the plaintiffs argued that the statute was a
denial of substantive due process. 23 The plaintiff oil companies also objected
to the requirements that prices and supplies be calculated on a nondiscriminatory basis, alleging that these provisions of the statute were in conflict
with the Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 197324 and the
Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act. 25 Agreeing with the plaintiffs,
the trial court held that the statute unconstitutionally deprived the oil
companies of their property without due process 26 and that it was preempted
by federal energy and antitrust laws. 27 On appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland reversed, holding that the statute was a valid exercise of the
29
state's police power 28 and that it did not conflict with federal laws.

22. In a consolidated action, the plaintiffs were Exxon Corporation, Shell Oil
Company, Gulf Oil Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Company, Ashland Oil, Inc.,
Continental Oil Company and its subsidiary Kayo Oil Company, and Commonwealth
Oil Refining Company, Inc. and its subsidiary Petroleum Marketing Corporation.
Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102, prob. juris. noted, 46
U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1977).
23. Id. at 423, 370 A.2d at 1110. In a similar case, a Florida statute requiring
divestment of service stations owned and operated by producers or refiners in excess
of three percent of the total number of all service stations that sold their branded
products was held unconstitutional as, inter alia, an improper exercise of the police
power. Exxon Corp. v. Conner, No. 74-1449 (Leon County Cir. Ct. Fla. Jan. 23, 1975).
The decision was not appealed. See also DEL. CODE tit. 6, §§ 2905-2906 (Cum. Supp.
1976).
24. 15 U.S.C. § 753 (Supp. III 1973).
25. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
California recently attempted to prohibit price discrimination by gasoline
suppliers among their dealers. A California statute provided that a defense would be
available to a price-discriminating supplier who could show "that his lower price to
any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a
competitor and was also offered to any other of his purchasers in competition with the
purchaser or purchasers receiving such lower price." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 21200
(West Supp. 1977). In Shell Oil Co. v. Younger, [1976-1] TRADE CASES (CCH) 60,960,
this statute was struck down by a federal district court on the ground that it was in
conflict with the federal Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1970).
26. Exxon Corp. v. Mandel, No. 22,066, slip op. at 90 (Anne Arundel County Cir.
Ct. filed Jan. 27, 1976).
27. The trial court granted summary judgment on this issue. Exxon Corp. v.
Mandel, No. 22,066 (Anne Arundel County Cir. Ct. Oct. 14, 1975) (mem.).
28. 279 Md. at 435, 370 A.2d at 1116.
29. Id. at 452, 370 A.2d at 1125.
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CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE DIVESTITURE PROVISIONS

The divestiture provisions of the Motor Fuel Inspection Law 3 were
attacked as violations of substantive due process. The plaintiffs contended
that the statute constituted an invalid exercise of the state's police power in
violation of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
United States Constitution and article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights. 31 The oil companies argued that forced divestiture was beyond the
police power of the state because it constituted an unjustified interference
with a lawful business and its effect would be anticompetitive and thus
32
contrary to the purpose of the statute.
In light of the contradictory testimony presented at the legislative
hearings 33 before the statute's enactment, and again at the trial stage of the
litigation, 34 the availability of the due process argument as a ground for
invalidating the statute depended upon whether the court would apply the
traditional standard for review of economic legislation, which permits
evaluation of legislative determinations, rather than the modern approach,
which upholds a statute if there could be any rational basis for its
enactment. The Court of Appeals of Maryland generally has adhered to the
traditional test, which requires that the court determine for itself whether
the challenged statute bears a "substantial relationship between its object
and the means employed to attain that object. ' 3 Recently, however, the
court has indicated that it may be prepared to supplant 36 the "real and
substantial" means to end test with the rational basis standard currently
applied by the Supreme Court. 37 Without expressly considering its past
30. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(b) & (c) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
31. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has long equated article 23 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights with the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment. 279 Md. at 423 n.3, 370 A.2d at 1110 n.3 (1977).
32. See note 19 supra.
33. Id.
34. Exxon Corp. v. Mandel, No. 22,066, slip op. at 69-70 (Anne Arundel County
Cir. Ct. filed Jan. 27, 1976).
35. Salisbury Beauty Schools v. State Bd. of Cosmetologists, 268 Md. 32, 48-49,
300 A.2d 367, 383 (1973). See also Maryland Bd. of Pharmacy v. Sav-A-Lot, Inc., 270
Md. 103, 311 A.2d 242 (1973); Maryland Coal & Realty Co. v. Bureau of Mines, 193 Md.
627, 69 A.2d 471 (1949); Schneider v. Duer, 170 Md. 326, 18 A.2d 914 (1936).
36. See Bowie Inn, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 274 Md. 230, 335 A.2d 679 (1975). In
Bowie Inn, the court, purporting to apply the real and substantial relationship test,
upheld a city ordinance requiring return deposits on soft drink containers on the
finding that the city "could rationally conclude that the deposit law should motivate
consumers to return containers." Id. at 237, 335 A.2d at 684. In Westchester West No. 2
Ltd. Partnership v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 348 A.2d 856 (1975), the court
noted that in view of recent Supreme Court decisions, "an even less stringent
standard than the 'real and substantial relation test,' with even greater deference to
the legislative judgment than required by that test, is the proper standard to be
applied in reviewing, under the due process clauses of the federal constitution,
economic regulatory legislation." Id. at 456 n.4, 348 A.2d at 860-61 n.4.
37. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd.of Pharmacy v. Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc.,
414 U.S. 156, 165 (1973); Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963); American Fed'n
of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949).
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practice, the court in Exxon clearly opted for a rational relationship analysis
and, consequently, had little difficulty in upholding the statute.38
Before responding to the plaintiffs' argument that divestiture would be
contrary to the purpose of the statute, the court observed that where
economic regulatory legislation is challenged on constitutional grounds, the
judicial function is very limited: "'[T]he wisdom or expediency of a law
adopted in the exercise of the police power of a state is not subject to judicial
review, and such a statute will not be held void if there are any
considerations relating to the public welfare by which it can be supported.'"39 The court stated that the test to be applied in evaluating
economic legislation is, first, whether there was "'an evil at hand for
correction'" and, second, whether "'it might be thought that the particular
legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.' ,4 Noting that judicial
deference to the legislature is particularly warranted where novel or
experimental methods are implemented to solve a difficult problem, 41 the
court held that the Maryland legislature could "reasonably conclude" from
the evidence presented to it that forward integration by major oil companies
into Maryland markets endangered competition and that divestiture was
"conceivably . . . a reasonable means of preserving competition." 42 The
court therefore concluded that the provisions were not contrary to the
purpose of the statute. 43 Further, because divestment had long been
44
recognized as an appropriate means of exercising the state's police power
38. 279 Md. at 429, 370 A.2d at 1113.
39. 279 Md. at 424, 370 A.2d at 1111 (quoting Westchester West No. 2 Ltd.
Partnership v. Montgomery County, 276 Md. 448, 455, 348 A.2d 856, 860 (1975)).
40. 279 Md. at 426, 370 A.2d at 1111 (quoting Williamson v. Lee Optical, Inc., 348
U.S. 483, 488 (1955)).
41. 279 Md. at 428, 370 A.2d at 1112-13. See Bowie Inn v. City of Bowie, 274 Md.
230, 237-38, 335 A.2d 679, 684 (1975).
42. 279 Md. at 427, 370 A.2d at 1112.
43. Id. at 429, 370 A.2d at 1113.
44. It is clear that divestment is not a totally novel means of regulation. Federal
statutes requiring divestment include: the Commodities Clause of the Hepburn Act,
49 U.S.C. § 1(8) (1970) (prohibiting railroads from transporting commodities they had
manufactured, mined or produced); the "Death Sentence" provision of the Public
Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1970) (authorizing the Securities
and Exchange Commission to restructure and simplify holding companies); the
Federal Alcohol Administration Act, 27 U.S.C. § 205(b) (1970) (prohibiting distillers
and producers of alcoholic beverages from maintaining "tied houses"); the National
Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. §24 (1974) (prohibiting national banks from underwriting
securities); 49 U.S.C. § 1378 (1970) (prohibiting airlines from engaging in allied
transportation businesses). Congress has considered restructure of the petroleum
industry, see, e.g., S.2082, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973) and S.2310, Amendment, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). See generally TIME, Nov. 3, 1975, at 78.
State statutes requiring divestment also exist and have been upheld in a
number of instances: Asbury Hospital v. Cass County, 326 U.S. 207 (1945) (North
Dakota prohibited any corporation from owning agricultural land in the state);
Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129 (1921) (prohibited any corporation that manufactured cotton seed oil from owning or operating cotton gins);
Paramount Pictures, Inc. v. Langer, 23 F. Supp. 890 (D.N.D. 1938), remanded with
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to regulate private property, 45 the plaintiff oil companies did not convince
the court that the regulation at issue was an unjustified interference with
46
their business.
Adopting similar reasoning, the Court of Appeals rejected the additional
contention of the oil companies that the statute unconstitutionally
discriminated between retail operations of integrated oil companies and, for
example, those of mass merchandisers and food retailers who are allowed to
own and operate retail outlets. 47 When economic legislation is challenged on
equal protection grounds, it must appear "'only that the classification...
be rationally related to a legitimate state interest.' ",48 The court acknowledged
the state interest in preserving competition among retail service stations
and suggested that oil company discrimination against retail service station
dealers and in favor of company operated stations may be an evil properly
remedied by excluding petroleum producers and refiners from the retail
market.49 Concluding that the statute therefore was not arbitrary, the court
held that it was rationally related to the pro-competitive purpose of the
legislation and that the equal protection challenge was without merit. °
The statute's divestiture provisions were also challenged as an
uncompensated taking of private property.5 1 Rejecting the plaintiffs'
argument, the Exxon court held that a state regulation constitutes a taking,
in the constitutional sense, only if it "essentially deprives the owner of all
beneficial uses of his property. ' 52 The Court of Appeals concluded that no
directions to dismiss on grounds of mootness, 306 U.S. 619 (1939) (North Dakota
prohibited operation and ownership of any theatre by producers or distributors who
made or had an interest in motion picture films).
45. See, e.g., Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 125 (1876); Goldman v. Crowther, 147
Md. 282, 287, 128 A. 50, 51-52 (1925). The Supreme Court has upheld state regulation
of businesses in a number of cases. See, e.g., North Dakota State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Snyder's Drug Stores, Inc., 414 U.S. 156, 167 (1973) (upholding a state statute
requiring that the majority of the company's stock be held by registered pharmacists
for a corporation to qualify for a permit to operate a pharmacy); Ferguson v. Skrupa,
372 U.S. 726, 731 (1963) (upholding a state statute prohibiting any person, except an
attorney, from engaging in the practice of debt adjusting); Williamson v. Lee Optical,
Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (upholding a state law allowing only licensed
optometrists or ophthamologists to fit lenses without a prescription).
46. See 279 Md. at 427-29, 370 A.2d at 1112-13.
47. Id. at 438-40, 370 A.2d at 1118-19. This claim was raised under the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution and under
the due process clause of article 23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Although
the Maryland Constitution does not explicitly refer to "equal protection," the court
assumed that the state due process clause includes the "concept of equal protection."
Id. at 438 n.8, 370 A.2d at 1118 n.8.
48. Id. at 439, 370 A.2d at 1118 (quoting City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 303-04 (1976)).
49. Id. at 440, 370 A.2d at 1118-19.
50. Id., 370 A.2d at 1119.
51. Id. at 436, 370 A.2d at 1117. This challenge was based on the fifth amendment
to the Federal Constitution and article III, § 40 of the Maryland Constitution.
52. Id. at 437, 370 A.2d at 1117. See also Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369
U.S. 590 (1962) (ordinance prohibiting excavation below the water table held not a
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taking had occurred in this case because the divestiture sections prohibit
only the combination of ownership and operation. Since no oil company is
denied ownership of a service station as long as it is leased to an
independent dealer, the statute did not deprive the oil companies involved in
direct retailing of all beneficial use of their outlets. 53
The Exxon plaintiffs also maintained that paragraphs (g) and (h) of the
statute constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority. 54 These
two provisions authorize the Comptroller to "adopt rules or regulations
defining the circumstances in which a producer or refiner temporarily may
operate a previously dealer-operated station" and to "permit reasonable
exceptions to . . . divestiture dates. ' 55 Although acknowledging that a

delegation of legislative authority must ordinarily be accompanied by
guidelines for administrative action, the court recognized that specific
guidelines often cannot be devised to handle the complicated economic
problems confronting legislatures today.5 6 In this case, where the delegation
involved the particularly complex gasoline marketing industry, the court
observed that it would be virtually impossible for the General Assembly to
anticipate and provide for each justified exemption from the divestment
dates.57 Hence, it was necessary and practical for the legislature to grant
taking of appellant excavator's property); Bureau of Mines v. George's Creek Coal and
Land Co., 272 Md. 143, 321 A.2d 748 (1974) (prohibition against mining state-acquired
land in which the plaintiff owned mineral rights held not a taking); Allied Am. Mut.
Fire Ins. Co. v. Comm'r of Motor Vehicles, 219 Md. 607, 150 A.2d 421 (1959)
(requirement that insurance companies contribute to the state uninsured motorist
fund held not a taking).
53. 279 Md. at 437-38, 370 A.2d at 1117. The court also indicated that the
statutory provision for reasonable delays and exceptions to the divestiture dates, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(g) & (h) (Cum. Supp. 1976), would lessen the impact of the
divestiture provisions on producers and refiners. 279 Md. at 438, 370 A.2d at 1117.
Presumably, the delays and exceptions allowed will assure that no company affected
by the act would be forced to accept low bids for property it decided to sell rather than
to convert to a dealership. Cf. Hand, The Commodities Clause and the Fifth
Amendment, 22 HARV. L. REV. 250, 263 (1909) ("[Ilt is important to remember that
some of the decrease in value may be the measure of that very advantage of
discrimination and of ultimate monopoly which it is the purpose of the act to
destroy.").
54. 279 Md. at 440, 370 A.2d at 1119. This attack was raised under article 8 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
55. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(g) & (h) (Cum. Supp. 1976). See also MD. ANN.
CODE art. 56, § 157B(a) (1972) (Comptroller authorized to issue rules and regulations in
the administration of the Motor Fuel Inspection Law).
56. 279 Md. at 440-41, 370 A.2d at 1119. See also Montgomery County v. Walsh,
274 Md. 502, 523-24, 336 A.2d 97, 110-11 (1975), appealdismissed, 424 U.S. 901 (1976);
Pressman v. Barnes, 209 Md. 544, 555, 121 A.2d 816, 822 (1956); Cohen, Some Aspects
of Maryland Administrative Law, 24 MD. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1964); Jaffe, An Essay on
Delegation of Legislative Power: II,47 COLUM. L. REV. 561, 592 (1947). Cf. Tomlinson,
Constitutional Limits on the Decisional Powers of Courts and Administrative
Agencies in Maryland, 35 MD. L. REV. 414 (1976) (discussing judicial review of
administrative agency decisions).
57. 279 Md. at 441, 370 A.2d at 1119.
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fairly broad discretion to the agency administering the statute.58 Without
expressly considering, therefore, whether the absence of statutory guidelines
could, as a matter of law, constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative
authority, 59 the Exxon court found no merit in this challenge.
Specific language in the Maryland statute - "producer or refiner,"
"voluntary allowances," "uniformly, ' ' 60 "equipment rentals, ' ' 61 "periods of
shortage," "uniformly. . .on an equitable basis" 62 - was also alleged to be
void for vagueness. 63 In general, criminal statutes must be sufficiently
definite to provide "a person of ordinary intelligence" with notice that
certain conduct is prohibited. 64 Where the statute regulates commercial
conduct, however, "ordinary intelligence" has been construed to mean
"ordinary commercial knowledge. ' 65 To determine the common commercial
meaning of these terms the Court of Appeals referred to their industry
usage, as found in affidavits and prior congressional testimony. 66 The court
decided that the provisions were sufficiently definite in the context of
industry practice so as not to constitute a denial of due process of law and,
6
accordingly, it rejected the vagueness argument.
The final challenge to the validity of the divestiture provisions was
based on the commerce clause of the Federal Constitution. 6 The plaintiff oil
companies argued that the divestment act was enacted "to protect local
retail service station dealers from competition by those engaged in interstate
commerce" and that this purpose was accomplished by denying "out-of-state
competitors access to local retail gasoline markets. ' ' 69 In support of their
58. Id.
59. For a discussion of cases where the Court of Appeals of Maryland has struck
down statutes for lack of articulated standards for agency enforcement, see Cohen,
Some Aspects of Maryland Administrative Law, 24 MD. L. REV. 1, 3-8 (1964).
60. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(d) and (e) (Cum. Supp. 1976). See note 110 and
accompanying text infra.
61. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(e) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
62. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976). See notes 89 to 104 and
accompanying text infra.
63. 279 Md. at 453, 370 A.2d at 1125. This challenge was raised under the due
process clauses of the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution and article
23 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Criminal penalties may be imposed for a
violation of the Motor Fuel Inspection Law. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157K (1972).
64. 279 Md. at 454, 370 A.2d at 1126 (quoting United States v. Harris, 347 U.S.
612, 617 (1954); Giant of Md., Inc. v. State's Attorney, 267 Md. 501, 514-15, 298 A.2d
427, 435, appeal dismissed, 412 U.S. 915 (1973)).
65. 279 Md. at 454, 370 A.2d at 1126. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 428 (1961).
66. 279 Md. at 445-47, 455, 370 A.2d at 1121-22, 1126.
67. Id. at 455, 370 A.2d at 1126.
68. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8,cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States").

69. 279 Md. at 429, 370 A.2d at 1113. This argument illustrates the classic conflict
between the principle that the "stream" of interstate commerce may not be burdened
by state regulation and the retained right of states to regulate internal matters,
including economic affairs, that affect the public welfare. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden,
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824). As a general proposition, in the absence of a need for
uniform regulation, state legislation that affects interstate commerce will not be held
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contention, the plaintiffs relied on several cases in which the Supreme Court
had struck down state statutes that in purpose and effect protected local
business from out-of-state competitors.70 The Exxon court reviewed these
cases and found that each involved statutes that "burdened the free flow of
commerce between the states by effectively hindering either the import or
export of goods,"71 whereas the Maryland divestiture provisions had no such
effect. The statute regulates only wholly intrastate retail marketing of
gasoline; the import or export of petroleum is unaffected.7 2 Moreover, the
statute does not differentiate on the basis of state citizenship as the oil
companies contended; all producers and refiners are prohibited from
operating retail service stations in Maryland and all out-of-state or
Maryland businesses not engaged in producing or refining are permitted to
do so.73 Thus, the court concluded that the Maryland statute does not
74
discriminate, either in purpose or effect, against interstate commerce.
Since it is well established that promotion of economic welfare is a
legitimate state interest,7 5 and that the states have the power to prevent
monopolistic behavior and to encourage active competition, the only
remaining question was whether commerce was unduly burdened by the
Act. The plaintiff oil companies argued that divestment would decrease
invalid unless it discriminates against or unduly burdens interstate commerce
without a justifiable local interest. See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520, 530 (1959); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951); H. P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 542 (1949); South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros. Inc., 303 U.S. 177, 185-86 (1938); Baldwin v. G. A. F.
Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 523-24 (1935); Note, The Commerce Clause and State
Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1469, 1476-77 (1961); Gasoline Marketing
Divestiture Statutes, supra note 8, at 1301-10. See also Note, Commerce Clause
Limitations upon States Regulationof Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REv. 1133, 1133-62
(1974).

70. See 279 Md. at 429-31, 370 A.2d at 1113. See also Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (municipal ordinance made it unlawful to sell milk in the
City of Madison unless processed and bottled within a five-mile radius of the city);
H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949) (New York refusal to license
out-of-state milk dealer on grounds that market was adequately serviced and that
license would not be in public interest); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511
(1935) (New York statute required sale price of milk imported from another state to be
no lower than the price paid for milk produced within New York).
71. 279 Md. at 431, 370 A.2d at 1114.
72. Id. Legislative history of the enactment indicates that the purpose of the

statute was not protective, but rather solely to preserve competition within the retail
gasoline marketing industry in Maryland. Id. See text accompanying notes 13 to 17
supra.
73. 279 Md. at 432, 370 A.2d at 1114-15. The statute's application was restricted
to producers and refiners because of the wide belief among experts that private brand
marketers constitute the most highly competitive force in the gasoline retail industry.
See, e.g., THE

CONTROL OF OIL,

supra note 8, at 237;

HIGHWAY ROBBERY,

supra note 8,

at 206-07; Gasoline Marketing Divestiture Statutes, supra note 8, at 1288.
74. 279 Md. at 435, 370 A.2d at 1116.
75. See, e.g., Crescent Cotton Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 257 U.S. 129, 137 (1921);
Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U.S. 86, 107 (1909); National Cotton Oil Co. v.
Texas, 197 U.S. 115, 129 (1905).
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gasoline and ser,ices available to interstate travelers. 76 The court, however,
viewed this argument as speculative and exaggerated 7 and concluded that
any "slight burden" upon commerce was outweighed by Maryland's interest
78
in preserving a competitive gasoline market.
FEDERAL PREEMPTION CHALLENGES TO THE EQUITABLE ALLOCATION AND
VOLUNTARY ALLOWANCE PROVISIONS

Two additional provisions of the Maryland statute were challenged
under the supremacy clause7 9 on the ground of federal preemption. s0
Paragraph (f) of the Maryland statute provides that during periods of
shortage, producers, refiners, and wholesalers shall "apportion uniformly all
gasoline and special fuels" to retail dealers "on an equitable basis, and shall
not discriminate among the dealers in their allotments."' ' The oil companies
contended that this provision conflicted with and was therefore preempted
by the Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973.82 Paragraph (d)
of the Maryland act requires in addition that producers, refiners, and
wholesalers "extend all voluntary allowances uniformly to all retail service
station dealers supplied. '8 3 The plaintiffs argued that this provision was in
conflict with the section 2(b) "meeting competition" defense of the Robinson84
Patman Price Discrimination Act.
Ordinarily, a state law will not be invalidated on preemption grounds in
the absence of a clear, unambiguously expressed congressional intent to
preempt the field.8 5 Furthermore, in situations where Congress has enacted
76. 279 Md. at 435, 370 A.2d at 1116.
77. Id. Out of the total of 1,573 service stations owned in Maryland as of July 1,
1974 by plaintiffs Exxon Corporation, Gulf Oil Corporation, Phillips Petroleum
Company, Shell Oil Company, and Texaco, Inc., only 51 of these stations were
company owned and operated. Id. at 436 n.6, 370 A.2d at 1116 n.6. Although three of
the plaintiffs - Ashland Oil, Inc., Kayo Oil Company, and Petroleum Marketing
Corporation - do business in the state solely through an aggregate of 56 company
owned and operated service stations, id. at 436 n.7, 370 A.2d at 1116 n.7,
representatives from at least two of these companies testified at trial that no decision
to withdraw from Maryland had been reached and that dealerships were an
alternative. Id. at 436, 370 A.2d at 1117.
78. Id. at 436, 370 A.2d at 1117.
79. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land").
80. See generally, Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of FederalPower, 45 U. COLO.
L. REV. 51 (1973); Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL.
L.F. 515; Note, The Preemption Doctrine:Shifting Perspectiveson Federalismand the
Burger Court, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 623 (1975); Note, The Commerce Clause and State
Antitrust Regulation, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1469 (1961); Note, Commerce Clause
Limitations upon State Regulation of Tender Offers, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 1133, 1163
(1974); Gasoline Marketing Divestiture Statutes, supra note 8, at 1311-17.
81. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760(h) (Supp. V 1975).
83. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970). See note 110 and accompanying text infra.
85. See De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976); Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 146-47 (1963); California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 733
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preemptive legislation, a state regulation may nonetheless stand unless
there is an actual8 6 or potential87 conflict between the two schemes or
between the state law and a purpose or policy of the federal law.-8 Thus, a
court presented with allegedly conflicting state and federal laws initially
must assess the purpose, operation, and effect of each before proceeding to
determine whether a conflict exists. This was the approach followed by the
Exxon court.
The Court of Appeals first considered the challenge to the equitable
allocation provision and concluded that the purposes of paragraph (f) of the
Maryland act89 and the Federal Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of
197390 were fundamentally harmonious. 9 The history of the Maryland
statute indicates that the legislature sought to prevent a supplier from
inequitably reducing gasoline supplies among dealers. 92 Therefore, when a
93
shortage arises, the statute requires a pro rata reduction to each dealer.
Similarly, Congress indicated that the federal allocation act was designed in
part to prevent the kind of manipulation of gasoline shortages by suppliers
that could result in decreased competition in gasoline retailing. 94 The federal
mandatory allocation scheme95 attempts to accomplish this result by
requiring "equitable distribution" among all dealers; 96 where practicable,
allocation programs must be designed so that a fuel shortage would result in
"a pro rata reduction in the amount allocated to each person engaged in the
marketing or distribution of a refined petroleum product. 9 s7 In light of these
similarities the court concluded that the purpose and operation of both
98
regulatory statutes are compatible.
(1949). Congressional intent may be inferred from a necessity for uniform federal
regulation, see, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624,
638-39 (1973) (the "delicate balance between safety and efficiency" persuaded the
Court to hold that federal legislation preempted local noise control ordinance), or from
an overriding federal interest, see, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68 (1941)
(Pennsylvania alien registration law preempted by similar federal statute; the Court
reasoned that "it is of importance that this legislation is in a field which affects
international relations").
86. See, e.g., Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971). The Supreme Court has
consistently cautioned that even a conflicting state law should be preempted only to
the extent required to preserve the aims of the federal statute. See De Canas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351, 357-58 n.5 (1976); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357
(1963).
87. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
88. See, e.g., Local 24, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283, 296-97
(1959).
89. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
90. 15 U.S.C. §§751-760(h) (Supp. V 1975).
91. 279 Md. at 442, 370 A.2d at 1119.
92. Id. at 441, 370 A.2d at 1119.
93. Id.
94. See H.R. REP. No. 93-531, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 9-10, reprinted in [1973] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2582, 2586-87.
95. 15 U.S.C. § 753 (Supp. V 1975).
96. Id. § 753(b)(1)(F).
97. Id. § 753(c)(1)(A).
98. 279 Md. at 444, 370 A.2d at 1120-21.
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The Exxon court emphasized that in enacting the Emergency Petroleum
Allocation Act of 1973, Congress expressly limited preemption to those state
laws that are in actual conflict with regulations promulgated pursuant to
the federal statute. 99 Current regulations establish that a supplier must
distribute gasoline under a ratio of its available supply over its current
obligations applied to a dealer's previous allocations. 1'0 Allocations in times
of short supply must be made on a pro rata basis under both the federal
regulations and the state statute. 10 1 The flexibility inherent in the
congressional scheme 10 2 is also evident in the Maryland provision, which
requires that allocations be made uniformly "on an equitable basis.'

10 3

Thus, finding no actual or potential conflict between the federal and state
statutes, the Court of Appeals concluded that the allocation provision was
0
not preempted by either the federal legislation or its regulations. 4
The most difficult issue confronting the Court of Appeals was whether
the voluntary allowance provision of the Maryland statute was preempted
by the Federal Robinson-Patman Act. 10 5 Under the Maryland law, any
voluntary allowance granted by a supplier of petroleum products to one of
106
its dealers must be extended to all of its other dealers throughout the state.
The Robinson-Patman Act likewise forbids discrimination in price by a
seller among its buyers. 07 The federal act, however, allows a pricediscriminating supplier to raise the "meeting competition" defense'0 in
99. Id. at 442-43, 370 A.2d at 1120. See 15 U.S.C. § 755(b) (Supp. V 1975).
Presidential authority to issue regulations under § 753 of the Federal Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act expires on September 30, 1981. 15 U.S.C. § 760(g) (Supp. V
1975).
100. A supplier "shall determine an allocation fraction" which is defined as an
amount "equal to its allocable supply ... divided by its supply obligation." 10 C.F.R.
§ 211.10(b) (1977). When a shortage arises - indicated by an allocation fraction of less
than one - suppliers "shall reduce, on a pro-rata basis, the amounts supplied." 10
C.F.R. §211.10(f) (1977).
101. 279 Md. at 443, 370 A.2d at 1120.
102. See, e.g., 10 C.F.R. §211.14(a) (1977) (Federal Energy Administration may
order transfer of supplies to compensate for regional imbalances).
103. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(f) (Cum. Supp. 1976). The court construed this
language to embrace the exercise of the Comptroller's discretion to permit variations
from uniform, pro-rata distributions. 279 Md. at 443, 370 A.2d at 1120. See MD. ANN.
CODE art. 56, § 157B(a) (1972) (Comptroller authorized to promulgate rules and
regulations necessary to administer the Motor Fuel Inspection Law). Cf. 2 MD. REG.
228 (1975) (Comptroller regulations regarding reasonable delays and procedures under
the divestment provisions of § 157E).
104. 279 Md. at 444, 370 A.2d at 1120-21.
105. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
106. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
107. It is clear that, by enacting the Robinson-Patman Act, Congress did not
intend to preempt all state regulations of price discrimination. See Schwegmann Bros.
Giant Super Mkts. v. Louisiana Milk Comm'n, 365 F. Supp. 1144, 1158 (M.D. La. 1973),
aff'd, 416 U.S. 922 (1974); Morton v. Nat'l Dairy Prods. Corp., 287 F. Supp. 753, 764
(E.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd, 414 F.2d 403 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1006 (1970).
108. This defense may be raised to rebut a showing of unlawful price discrimination and provides in pertinent part:

1977]

GASOLINE MARKETING PRACTICES

certain circumstances; no such excuse is allowed under the Maryland
statutory scheme. It was this discrepancy between the two schemes that
gave rise to the federal preemption challenge.
The nature and scope of the Robinson-Patman "meeting competition"
defense is a matter of dispute. The Supreme Court, lower federal courts, and
the Federal Trade Commission have each given conflicting constructions of
this defense. In holding that the two price regulations were not in actual or
potential conflict, the Court of Appeals of Maryland adopted an interpretation of the federal defense sufficiently narrow so that there appears to be no
possibility of conflict with the state statute. Preliminary to reaching its
interpretation, the Exxon court defined the purpose and scope of each
provision and determined in what circumstances each statute would apply.
The court then decided whether a conflict could arise.
Paragraph (d) of the Maryland statute requires that producers, refiners,
and wholesalers supplying gasoline to retail dealers "extend all voluntary
allowances uniformly to all retail service station dealers supplied."' 10 9 The
Court of Appeals construed "voluntary allowances" to mean "temporary
price reductions in the wholesale price to a retail dealer to enable the dealer
to meet the lower price of a competing retail dealer." 110 The requirement that
voluntary allowances be uniform was included in the act to ensure that all
dealers selling the same brand would be treated equally."' The court noted
that this provision comports with the general policy of the Maryland statute
2
to prevent suppliers from discriminating among retail dealers."
Under the federal scheme, a violation of section 2(a) of the RobinsonPatman Act will be found where "any person ...discriminate[s] in price
between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality ...
where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen
[N]othing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie
case thus made by showing that his lower price or the furnishing of services
or facilities to any purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor.
15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
109. MD. ANN. CODE art. 56, § 157E(d) (Cum. Supp. 1976).
110. 279 Md. at 447, 370 A.2d at 1122. This definition is consistent with industry

usage of the term. See Affidavit of Shell, Joint Record Extract at 100; Affidavit of
Exxon, Joint Record Extract at 89; Affidavit of Gulf, Joint Record Extract at 108. See
also note Ill and accompanying text infra.
111. The abuses inherent in the practice of granting voluntary allowances are
illustrated by the phenomenon of price wars, which involve a selective lowering of
prices to only those dealers facing vigorous price competition. The practice often
results in economic injury both to dealers not receiving the discount and to
independent marketers, as well as contributing generally to an unstable market. See
Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1972); 1970
Hearings, supra note 12, at 53, 58, 68-90; COMPETITION, LTD., supra note 7, at 179-80;
HIGHWAY ROBBERY, supra note 8, at 43, 204; Note, Competition in GasolineRetailing:
A Price War, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 644 (1953). See also S. REP. No. 2810, 84th Cong., 2d
Sess. 19 (1956) (price support utilized to contain competition to a local area).
112. 279 Md. at 447, 370 A.2d at 1122.
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competition." ' 13 Section 2(b), however, permits a seller to rebut a showing of
a section 2(a) violation "by showing that his lower price ... to any

purchaser or purchasers was made in good faith to meet an equally low price
of a competitor."

'

4

The plaintiffs in Exxon argued that paragraph (d) would require oil
companies that gave voluntary allowances to violate section 2(a) of the
Robinson-Patman Act while precluding them from raising the section 2(b)
"meeting competition" defense."15 The plaintiffs' position was that section
2(b) would protect a supplier against the charge of a section 2(a) violation
where the supplier temporarily reduced wholesale prices of gasoline to a
retail dealer to enable that dealer to meet the reduced retail price of a
competing dealer. 1 6 In this situation, paragraph (d) of the Maryland statute
would require the supplier to extend the discount to all of its Maryland
dealers. Plaintiffs argued that, as a result of the operation of paragraph (d),
dealers in border areas surrounding Maryland not receiving the discount
could hold the supplier liable for damages under section 2(a)." 7 Moreover,
the supplier could not avail itself of the section 2(b) defense because the
violation would stem from compliance with the Maryland statute rather
than from an effort to meet a competitive threat. 1 8
In evaluating whether the Maryland statute requires suppliers to violate
section 2(a), a threshold question is whether section 2(a) would necessarily
be violated where a supplier grants reduced prices to selected retail dealers.
For a violation to occur, certain jurisdictional requirements must be met: in
addition to a discrimination in price between two purchasers that
substantially lessens competition, at least one sale must be in interstate
commerce. 119 In the situation described by the plaintiff oil companies the
interstate commerce requirement could be met because, under paragraph (d),
any discount offered to one Maryland dealer must be extended to all

113. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
114. Id. § 13(b). In general, the purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act was to
maximize equal opportunities among small, independent businessmen by preventing
price favoritism by suppliers of goods. See FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 520
(1963); S.REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d
Sess. 3-17 (1936); 79 CONG. REC. 9078 (1935). The congressional prohibition against
price discrimination is a mandate of price uniformity unless justified, for example, by
a bona fide competitive threat to the supplier. Thus, as construed by the Court of
Appeals of Maryland, both paragraph (d) and the Robinson-Patman Act were
designed to promote uniformity in prices offered by suppliers to their dealers.
115. Brief for Appellee at 40, Governor of Md. v. Exxon, 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d 1102
(1977). The plaintiffs observed that their liability under § 2(a) would be the same
regardless of whether the party suffering the competitive injury was another supplier
or a retail dealer. For the purposes of this discussion, the analysis will be limited to
dealer level competition.
116. See 279 Md. at 448, 370 A.2d at 1122.
117. Brief for Appellee at 43-44, Governor of Md. v. Exxon, 279 Md. 410, 370 A.2d
1102 (1977).
118. Id. at 44.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
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Maryland retailers. Hence, all Maryland dealers may have purchased
supplies at a price lower than those charged to neighboring dealers in, for
example, the District of Columbia. 12°
Assuming, arguendo, that compliance with paragraph (d) could result in
price discrimination between Maryland and non-Maryland dealers, section
2(a) still would not be violated unless the discrimination had a debilitating
effect on competition. 12' Because the statutory test of competitive injury
requires only that "the effect of [a price] discrimination may be substantially to lessen competition,"'' 22 section 2(a) has been construed to apply
whenever the discrimination is shown potentially to threaten normal
competition.1 23 In the oil industry, such a potential threat could not occur at
the supplier level because major oil companies generally do not compete for
sales to retail stations. 24 At the retail level, however, regardless of whether
the retail outlet passed such a discount on to consumers, an injury to
competition would appear to be present if all Maryland dealers were given a
discount under paragraph (d) and neighboring dealers were denied a similar
allowance. 25 Hence, the Exxon plaintiffs correctly pointed out that
120. See generally Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 237-38 (1951); Mayer
Paving and Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763, 769 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Kintner & Mayne, Interstate Commerce Requirement of the Robinson-Patman Price DiscriminationAct, 58 GEo. L.J. 1117, 1130-33
(1970); Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Commodities in Commerce: Jurisdictional
Criteria Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 67 YALE L.J. 1155, 1166-70 (1958); 27
VAND. L. REV. 539 (1974).
121. The language of the statute prohibits a lessening of "competition." 15 U.S.C.
§ 13(a) (1970). See Purex Corp., Ltd., 51 F.T.C. 100, 112-14 (1954); C. EDWARDS, THE
PRICE DISCRIMINATION LAW 32 (1959) [hereinafter cited as C. EDWARDS]; F. ROWE,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT §6.5 (1962) [hereinafter
cited as F. ROWE]. The Supreme Court has stated clearly that the illegality of a price
discrimination is conditioned on the showing of an injury to competition. See FTC v.
Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 527 n.16 (1963); FrC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536,
550 (1960); Note, Competitive Injury Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 1597 (1961).
122. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
123. In both FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 46 (1948), and Corn Prods. Ref.
Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945), the Supreme Court stated that price
discriminations are prohibited if there is a "reasonable possibility" that competition
may be injured. Cf. F. ROWE, supra note 121, at § 6.7 (the controversy over whether the
proper test is "reasonable possibility" or "reasonable probability" is academic).
124. One method of securing retail outlets by major oil companies is the use of
short-term leases. See COMPETITION, LTD., supra note 7, at 44-46; Gasoline Marketing
Divestiture Statutes, supra note 8, at 1285; Note, Gasoline Marketing and the
Robinson-Patman Act, 82 YALE L.J. 1706, 1707-09 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Gasoline Marketing]. In Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co., 136 F. Supp. 420, 421
(D. Conn. 1955), the court stated "[in view of short term station ... leases ...
perhaps it is a fiction to speak of price competition at the oil company sale to the
station level." Cf. F. ROWE, supra note 121, at 142 (a prerequisite to a § 2(a) injury at
the retail level is a "competitive relationship" between sellers of a product). See, e.g.,

Commission Policy with Respect to Anti-Competitive Practices in the Marketing of
Gasoline, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH)

10,373, at 18,240.

125. See generally Gifford, Assessing Secondary-Line Injury Under the RobinsonPatman Act: The Concept of "Competitive Advantage," 44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 48
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compliance with paragraph (d) of the Maryland statute could result in a
violation of section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act at border areas.
However, no such violation would necessarily result from compliance
with the Maryland statute. If voluntary allowances as defined by the Exxon
court were granted only to some Maryland dealers, the discount would result
in a section 2(a) violation within Maryland. Paragraph (d) merely requires
that if a supplier desires selectively to lower prices to one Maryland dealer in
apparent violation of the Robinson-Patman Act, it may not also discriminate against other Maryland dealers. By requiring uniform allowances,
paragraph (d) simply precludes the possibility of competitive injury within
Maryland.
Moreover, the Maryland law does not prevent oil companies from
employing traditional methods of avoiding a section 2(a) violation. For
example, harm to competition at border areas may be prevented by
establishing a system of "feathering." Feathering describes a system of
price zoning established by oil companies to localize price cuts. In order to
minimize the effect of a reduction, prices are progressively stabilized at
increasing differentials as the distance from the price discount increases.
This practice has been suggested by the Supreme Court as a practical
method of avoiding injury to competition,126 the Federal Trade Commission
has sanctioned its use, 127 and it often has been utilized by oil companies. 12
Thus, although it seems clear that price discrimination by a supplier among
its branded dealers may result in a violation of section 2(a) of the RobinsonPatman Act, the operation of paragraph (d) of the Maryland act has no
effect upon this violation other than to prevent it from occurring within
Maryland's borders. If the price-discriminating supplier wishes to avoid
liability for the effects of its discrimination on neighboring dealers, it could
utilize the industry practice of feathering prices.

(1975). Gifford suggests that the assumption that a discount to a "favored" dealer
works to his competitive advantage is accurate only if the saving is reflected in his
resale price. Id. at 59-60. Of course, it is also true that there need be only a
"reasonable possibility" that the discount will be passed on to consumers. See, e.g.,
Corn Prods. Ref. Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726, 742 (1945). In the event that a Maryland
dealer received an allowance on the wholesale price of gasoline and declined to reflect
the discount in resale prices, it is arguable that the dealer has been granted a
competitive advantage - whether reflected in a lower supply cost, extra capital, or
increased service to consumers. See, e.g., Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372, 1379 (6th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 871 (1971); Foremost Dairies, Inc. v. FTC, 348 F.2d 674, 680
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 959 (1965); William H. Rorer, Inc., 69 F.T.C. 667,
726-27 (1966), modified and enforced, 374 F.2d 662 (2d Cir. 1967). But see Gifford,
supra at 70-80 (increased services may also result in increased costs of providing
those services above the discount saving).
126. FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 527-28 n.17 (1963).
127. Commission Policy with Respect to Anti-Competitive Practices in the
Marketing of Gasoline,3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 10,373, at 18,242-43. But see notes
165 to 170 and accompanying text infra.
128. See, e.g., Bargain Car Wash, Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 466 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir.
1972).
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The plaintiff oil companies contended that even if the statute did not
require them to violate section 2(a) whenever they gave voluntary
allowances, they would nevertheless violate section 2(a) in situations where
feathering was impracticable. Absent paragraph (d), they would be able to
invoke the section 2(b) "meeting competition" defense. As a result of the
Maryland statute, however, they would be precluded from invoking the
section 2(b) defense because the price discrimination between Maryland and
non-Maryland dealers would have resulted from compliance with paragraph
(d) rather than from the effort to meet the competition that prompted the
initial dealer discount. The plaintiffs argued that the defense afforded by
section 2(b), therefore, preempted paragraph (d) of the Maryland statute. To
evaluate the plaintiffs' position, the Exxon court had to determine whether
the section 2(b) defense could properly be invoked by a supplier acting in
129
response to dealer level competition.
The original meeting competition defense contained in section 2 of the
Clayton Act permitted price discrimination to be justified by a showing that
it had been made "to meet competition." '130 This broad language proved
unworkable as it tended to extend to nearly every instance of price
discrimination.' 3 ' Thus, in 1936, the Clayton Act was amended by the
Robinson-Patman Act to permit price discrimination to be justified only
132
when "made in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor."'
As noted by the Exxon court, the House Committee considered the
amendment a "contraction" of the Clayton Act section 2 defense because it
only permits "the seller to meet the price actually previously offered by a
133
local competitor."
Whatever controversy may surround the Robinson-Patman Act section
2(b) defense, it is clear that it protects a seller who grants a price allowance
to a dealer to retain his business in the face of a similarly low price offered
129. It is widely acknowledged that the Robinson-Patman Act was thought
necessary to protect small businessmen from their large competitors who forced

common suppliers to grant selective discounts only to those large purchasers and to
prevent large sellers from subsidizing below cost sales in a competitive market with
monopoly profits derived from a controlled market. See, e.g., FTC v. Sun Oil Co., 371
U.S. 505, 518-23 (1963); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 537, 543-44 (1960);
Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140,1142 n.1 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116
(1973); C. EDWARDS, supra note 121, at 10-12; The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77
HARV. L. REV. 62, 175 (1963).
130. 38 Stat. 730 (1914). The Federal Trade Commission explained that this defense
was designed to permit a seller to lower prices to a buyer in response to a competitor's
attempt to woo that buyer away. See In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 22 F.T.C. 232,
331 (1936), reu'd on other grounds, 101 F.2d 620 (6th Cir. 1939). See generally Note,
Meeting Competition Under the Robinson-PatmanAct, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1476, 1484
n.47 (1977).

131. See generally C.

EDWARDS,

supra note 121, at 6, 38-40; W. PATMAN,

COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT

90-92 (1963); F. RowE, supra note

121, at 208-14.
132. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
133. 279 Md. at 450, 370 A.2d at 1123-24 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 16 (1936)).
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to that dealer by a competing supplier. 134 The oil company plaintiffs argued,
however, that section 2(b) would also protect a supplier against section 2(a)
liability where that supplier had temporarily reduced the wholesale price of
gasoline to a retail dealer to enable that dealer to meet the price of a
competing dealer.135 Under the plaintiffs' interpretation, it followed that the
purpose of section 2(b) to allow a seller to respond selectively to dealer-level
competition would be defeated by the paragraph (d) requirement that the
supplier extend the discount to all of its dealers. The court rejected the
plaintiffs' interpretation of section 2(b), holding that the defense was
restricted to the situation where a supplier offered a reduced price to a retail
dealer in order to meet an equally low price offered to that same dealer by a
competing supplier. 136 Under the court's interpretation of voluntary
allowance,137 the uniformity requirement in paragraph (d) could not apply in
that situation and, therefore, the section 2(b) defense would be unaffected by
the Maryland statute. In order to evaluate the validity of these positions, it
is necessary to consider the applicability of the Robinson-Patman Act to
suppliers such as the plaintiff oil companies.
Support for the plaintiffs' approach was found in Bargain Car Wash,
Inc. u. Standard Oil Co. (Indiana), 3 8 where the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit indicated that the section 2(b) defense was
available to a supplier who granted a discount to one of its dealers to meet a
similar discount received by its dealer's retail competitor from a competing
supplier. 139 In that case, Bargain Car Wash's supplier, American Oil
Company, had established a system of narrowly drawn "price zones" by
which it granted discounts to dealers. 140 During one year American gave
discounts to some of its retailers but did not offer the same rebate to Bargain
Car Wash, thereby placing Bargain at a severe competitive disadvantage
with respect to all its competitors.141 There was little question that this
discriminatory practice resulted in a violation of section 2(a). 142 The oil
company defendant, however, attempted to justify the discrimination on the
basis of section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act. 43 Noting that the
Supreme Court had not decided whether section 2(b) applied to protect
suppliers who grant their dealers allowances to permit them to compete with
134. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249-50 (1951); Krieger v.
Texaco, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 108, 112 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
135. 279 Md. at 448, 370 A.2d at 1122.
136. Id. at 451-52, 370 A.2d at 1124.
137. See note 110 and accompanying text supra.
138. 466 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1972).
139. Id. at 1175.
140. Id. at 1167-68. The court indicated that the zones may have been drawn
arbitrarily and not in response to actual competitive conditions. Id. at 1168. For
example, American had carved the 1.5 mile radius around the plaintiffs station into
22 separate price zones. Id. at 1169.
141. Id. Bargain Car Wash was in competition both with other American dealers
and with other major brand dealers. Id. at 1168-69 & n.4.
142. Id. at 1174-75.
143. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
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other dealers receiving discounts from their suppliers, the court stated that it
was "inclined to the view" that the defense was available in this
situation. 14 4 Relying upon a position adopted by the Federal Trade
Commission, 14 5 the Bargain Car Wash court held that section 2(b) could be
asserted as a defense by American. 14 6 However, the system of zone pricing
could not be used as evidence of a competitive threat; the defendant must
show that each price reduction was granted in response to a true economic
threat. 47 In Exxon, the plaintiff oil companies urged the Court of Appeals of
Maryland to adopt the Bargain Car Wash approach.
In assessing the scope of the section 2(b) defense, the Exxon court first
identified the two situations in which competition at the retail level would
occur: "Either a competing retail dealer would lower its price on its own or a
competing retailer would lower its price after receiving a reduction in the
wholesale price from its suppliers."' 48 The Exxon court ruled out the
applicability of the section 2(b) defense to the first situation by looking to
the Sun Oil case. The Supreme Court, in FTC v. Sun Oil Co.,149 clearly
established that the section 2(b) defense was not available in the former
competitive situation. In Sun Oil, a major, vertically integrated oil company
granted discounts to one of its branded dealers who had lost business to a
competing dealer in a price war.1a1 There were several other Sun Oil dealers
in the area who did not receive a discount; the losses they suffered clearly
established that section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act had been violated.' 51 The only issue in the case was whether Sun Oil could assert the section 2(b) "meeting competition" defense. 1 52 Assuming that the competing
dealer was not an outlet for an integrated oil company and that it had not
received a discount from its supplier, 15: the Court held that the defense was
not available to Sun Oil.' '. 4 Relying on the language of section 2(b), the
Court determined that it applied only to a supplier responding to direct
competition from another supplier and did not protect a supplier who
144. 466 F.2d at 1175. This position was criticized in Gasoline Marketing, supra
note 124.
145. See Commission Policy with Respect to Anti-Competitive Practices in the
Marketing of Gasoline,3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 10,373, at 18,242-43; notes 155 to
160 and accompanying text infra.
146. 466 F.2d at 1175-76.
147. Id. at 1176. The case was remanded for a hearing on the § 2(b) defense. Id. at
1176-77. There is no subsequent history of the disposition of this case on remand.
Although an argument can be made that the Bargain Car Wash court's treatment of
the § 2(b) defense was dicta, the Court of Appeals of Maryland in Governor of Md. v.
Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410, 449, 370 A.2d 1102, 1123, prob. juris. noted, 46 U.S.L.W.
3214 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1977), accepted the position as a holding and, for the purposes of
discussion, it will be treated as such here.
148. 279 Md. at 448, 370 A.2d at 1122-23.
149. 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
150. Id. at 506-09.
151. Id. at 510-12.
152. Id. at 512.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 529.
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attempted to respond to competition between its customer and a competitor
155
of that customer.
The Sun Oil Court, however, expressly reserved the question whether
section 2(b) was available in the situation where the competing dealer had
been granted an allowance by its supplier. 156 This question has not yet been
resolved by the Supreme Court and, as noted in Exxon," 7 an apparent
conflict has developed in the lower federal courts. Rejecting the plaintiffs'
reliance on the Bargain Car Wash approach, the Maryland court adopted
the contrary view of Enterprise Industries, Inc. v. Texas Co.,158 where the
United States District Court for the District of Connecticut held that the
section 2(b) defense was available only to a supplier who offered a lower
price to one of its dealers in order to meet an equally low price offered to that
159
same dealer by a competing supplier.
In its decision disallowing the section 2(b) defense to a major, integrated
oil company defendant, the Enterprise court looked both to the scope of the
statutory language and to the nature of competition in the gasoline retailing
1
industry. '0
The court concluded that the Robinson-Patman Act permits a
supplier to meet competition by its competitor,' 6' but its protection does not
extend to a supplier who wishes to meet the competition of its buyer's
competitor. 62 The court observed that the defense would not apply at the
supplier level because suppliers are not in competition for sales to service
station dealers; the seller-buyer relationship is effectively fixed through
station and equipment leases.'16 3 While it may be true that wholesale buyers
of gasoline compete for retail sale to the public, the court held that the
Robinson-Patman section 2(b) defense remains limited to the supplier-level
of competition and "does not go so far as to allow discriminatory price
'6 4
cutting by a supplier to enable a buyer to meet price competition."'
In accepting the reasoning of the Enterprise court, the Exxon court
rejected the current position of the Federal Trade Commission. The Federal
Trade Commission has not maintained a consistent position on the scope of
the Robinson-Patman section 2(b) "meeting competition" defense.' 6 " In
155. Id. at 512-17.
156. Id. at 512 n.7.
157. 279 Md. at 448, 370 A.2d at 1123.
158. 136 F. Supp. 420 (D. Conn. 1955), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957). This civil case arose out of a gasoline "price
war." During one period of price instability the defendant Texas Company had
granted allowances to branded dealers other than the plaintiff.
159. Id. at 421. Cf. Bolick-Gillman Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 206 F. Supp. 151,
159-60 (D. Nev. 1961) (in deciding that plaintiff and defendant were not competing
suppliers in the § 2(a) sense, the court approved a reading of § 2(b) that restricted it to
competition at the retail level).
160. 136 F. Supp. at 421.
161. 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1970).
162. 136 F. Supp. at 421.
163. Id.
164. Id. (emphasis in original).
165. See 279 Md. at 449, 370 A.2d at 1123; Gasoline Marketing, supra note 123, at
1713 n.44 (the commentator explains that before the Enterprisecase the FTC believed
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the 1950's, the FTC adopted the Enterprise approach to the section 2(b)
defense 16 6 and, in the Sun Oil case, 167 convinced the Supreme Court that the
defense did not apply to a supplier who granted a price discount to a dealer
threatened by competition. In 1967, however, the FTC reversed its policy
and, in response to the question left open in Sun Oil,168 stated that "a price
reduction by one supplier to its customer which is reflected in the latter's
retail price may be lawfully met by a comparable reduction by another
supplier to its customer."'1 69 The Commission recognized that major oil
companies do not compete for sales to retail dealers but argued that
suppliers should be able to respond competitively to each other through their
retail dealers.1 70

that suppliers could claim the § 2(b) defense in response to charges of treating dealers
unequally without regard to whether the exclusive dealing relationship was threatened).
166. In re Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955 (1959), order set aside, 294 F.2d 465 (5th Cir.
1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 505 (1963). In Sun Oil, the Commission specifically relied on the
Enterprise doctrine and stated that "2(b) has reference to the good faith meeting of
competition of the seller, and not the competition of the buyer, as in this case." Id. at
965 (emphasis in original). After Enterprise was decided, a senate subcommittee
encouraged the Commission to continue to adhere to this position to eliminate
unlawful price discrimination. S. REP. No. 2710, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1956).
167. 371 U.S. 505, 529 (1963).
168. See text accompanying note 156 supra.
169. Commission Policy with Respect to Anti-Competitive Practices in the
Marketing of Gasoline, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 10,373, at 18,245. Apparently, this
policy applies only to contests between integrated oil companies and their dealers. In
an earlier part of its report, the Commission indicated that if a major brand supplier
interfered with retail competition in order to discipline a private brand marketer, § 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1970), might be violated. Id. at
18,243.
The Commission further suggested in its report that zone pricing would be an
appropriate method of sidestepping a § 2(a) competitive injury while engaging in
discriminatory pricing. Id. at 18,242. It should be noted, however, that courts have
rarely accepted a pricing "scheme" as a justification for price discrimination. See, e.g.,
F rC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 431 (1957); FTC v. A. E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324
U.S. 746, 753 (1945). See generally F. RowE, supra note 121, at § 9.7; Note, Pricing
Systems and the Meeting Competition Defense, 49 VA. L. REv. 1325 (1963). One
commentator has suggested that the Commission's position creates problems of proof
and enforcement, and "may actually be an inarticulate proxy for the Enterprise
doctrine"; judicial disallowance of the defense in a "system -pricing" scheme
ultimately rests on the absence of a true competitive threat. Gasoline Marketing,
supra note 123, at 1716-17.
170. Commission Policy with Respect to Anti-Competitive Practices in the
Marketing of Gasoline, 3 TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 10,373, at 18,245. The weaknesses
of the "conduit" theory (i.e., wholesalers partaking in retail competition) are discussed
at notes 187 to 190 and accompanying text infra.
The Commission, however, does not appear to be adhering to its 1967 policy
as evidenced by its response to a recent complaint against a major, integrated oil
company for unfair competition. In that case, the FTC's proposal for relief required
that gasoline be sold to dealers at uniform prices throughout a competitive area. See
Standard Oil Co. (Ohio), [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 20,134,
at 22,122.
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By adopting the interpretation of the section 2(b) defense reflected in the
original FTC position and applied in the Enterprise case, the Court of
Appeals of Maryland aligned itself with the logic of the Supreme Court's
decision in Sun Oil. In Sun Oil, the Supreme Court refused to extend the
section 2(b) defense to a situation where an integrated oil company reduced
prices to its dealer to allow the dealer to respond to a competitor's prices; the
Court reasoned that the supplier was not in competition with its dealer's
competitor and in the absence of this level of competition the defense simply
did not apply. It was a logical extension of this reasoning that led the Exxon
court to conclude that even where the competitor of the supplier's dealer is a
major brand outlet, the supplier is nonetheless not "in competition" with
71
that rival dealer within the meaning of the Robinson-Patman Act.
The Supreme Court in Sun Oil narrowly construed the section 2(b)
phrase "equally low price of a competitor" to refer to "the price of a
competitor of the seller who grants, and not of the buyer who receives, the
discriminatory price cut."' 1 2 Acknowledging the section 2(a) prohibition of
anticompetitive effects arising out of a price discrimination "in any line of
commerce,' 17 3 the Court reasoned that the narrower language in section 2(b)
was intended by Congress to limit the defense to the acting parties - the
sellers. 174 Further, the Court pointed out that "[l]inguistically and practically" it would be absurd to read the section 2(b) defense to allow a supplier
to match his wholesale price to an equally low retail price posted by the
competitor of the supplier's dealer. 7 5 Wholesale prices are generally lower
than retail prices. Finally, the Court rejected the suggestion that the defense
permitted a supplier to reduce his wholesale price to allow a dealer in turn to
meet lower retail price competition, finding no indication that the statute
76
contemplated a two-step transaction.
It appears, moreover, that the fundamental purpose of the RobinsonPatman Act precludes an extension of the defense beyond this limited scope.
In allowing the "meeting competition" defense Congress intended to deal
with a narrow problem: sellers should be allowed to compete with other
sellers for the business of buyers without the legal requirement that a price
concession be offered to all customers. 177 In Exxon, the Court of Appeals of
171. See text accompanying notes 160 to 164 supra.
172. 371 U.S. 505, 514 (1963).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1970).
174. 371 U.S. at 514-15.
175. Id. at 515.
176. Id. at 516.
177. See, e.g., FrC v. Sun Oil Co., 371 U.S. 505, 522 (1963); Standard Oil Co. v.
FTC, 340 U.S. 231, 249-50 (1951); Governor of Md. v. Exxon Corp., 279 Md. 410,
450-51, 370 A.2d 1102, 1124, prob. juris. noted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3214 (U.S. Oct. 3, 1977);
The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REv. 62, 175 (1963).
It has been noted that restricting the scope of the § 2(b) defense makes
economic sense. "[Wihere in fact the favored buyer has received a low nondiscriminatory offer from a competing seller, the seller who meets that offer with a
discriminatory price cut is injuring the disfavored buyers no more than they would be
injured anyway." C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 188 (1959).
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Maryland stated that to expand the section 2(b) defense beyond this
situation would result in anticompetitive conditions contrary to the aim of
antitrust legislation. 78 Allowing suppliers to grant selective price discounts
where the reductions are
results in a lessening of competition, particularly
179
leveled against independent marketers.
Major brand oil companies have argued that they are in competition
with each other for sales to consumers through independent retail dealers
and that, therefore, competition among dealers is really competition among
suppliers that they are entitled to meet under section 2(b). While this
82
it was
argument was rejected in Sun Oil,180 Enterprise,'8 ' and Exxon,
8 3
The Federal Trade Commisapparently accepted in Bargain Car Wash.
sion rejected the "conduit"8 5theory in Sun OiJ84 but currently seems to
adhere to a contrary view.
There is a difference of opinion on the question whether integrated oil
companies actually are in competition with each other for sales of gasoline
to the public. 86 It was conclusively determined by the Sun Oil Court's
rejection of the "conduit" theory that an independent retailer is not a
"competitor" of a major oil company for the purposes of the RobinsonPatman section 2(b) defense.8 7 In rejecting the plaintiffs' theory, the Court
emphasized the amorphous nature of the "conduit" argument: "In a very
real sense . . .every retailer is but a 'conduit' for the goods which it sells.

...We are sure Congress had no such broad conception of competition in
mind."188 The irrelevance of the conduit argument is demonstrated by the
178. 279 Md. at 451, 370 A.2d at 1124.
179. Id.
180. 371 U.S. 505, 524-25 (1963).
181. See 136 F. Supp. 420, 421 (D. Conn.), rev'd on other grounds, 240 F.2d 457 (2d
Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 965 (1957).
182. See 279 Md. at 451, 370 A.2d at 1124.
183. See 466 F.2d 1163, 1175-76 (7th Cir. 1972).
184. In re Sun Oil Co., 55 F.T.C. 955, 965 (1959), order set aside, 294 F.2d 465 (5th
Cir. 1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 505 (1963).
185. See Commission Policy with Respect to Anti-Competitive Practices in the
Marketing of Gasoline, 3 TRADE REG. REP (CCH) 10,373, at 18,245.
186. Indeed, the Fifth Circuit assumed in its Sun Oil opinion that the case involved
two integrated oil companies and allowed the § 2(b) defense. 294 F.2d 465, 466-67 (5th
Cir. 1961). The Supreme Court rejected this assumption and disallowed the defense,
reversing the Fifth Circuit. 371 U.S. 505 (1963). When the Fifth Circuit's disposition of
Sun Oil was announced, commentators approved its conclusion that integrated oil
companies are in retail competiton. See, e.g., 62 COLUM. L. REV. 171, 174 (1962); 1962
DUKE L.J. 300, 304-05; 75 HARV. L. REV. 429, 430 (1961). But see Note, Meeting
Competition and the Sun Oil Case: Repudiation of the Enterprise Doctrine,29 U. CRI.
L. REV. 355 (1962). The Supreme Court's decision also received approval. See, e.g., The
Supreme Court, 1962 Term, 77 HARV. L. REV. 81, 175 (1963). It has been suggested that
innumerable joint ventures and the practice of carving the country into separately
controlled retail markets has effectively eliminated any competition among major,
integrated petroleum companies. See THE CONTROL OF OIL, supra note 8, at 136,
150-51. Cf. C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY 136 (1959) ("the joint venture
...may be viewed as a form of quasi merger").
187. See 371 U.S. 505, 524-25 (1963).
188. Id. at 524.
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realities of gasoline marketing; most significantly, the overwhelming
majority of service station operators are independent businessmen. 8 9 In
order for a court to recognize suppliers as competitors at the retail level they
would have to find that there was control over prices - in short, that a
violation of the antitrust laws had occurred. 19
The Enterprise doctrine thus appears to be supported by the language
and purpose of the Robinson-Patman Act's "meeting competition" defense.
By adopting this approach in the Exxon case, the Court of Appeals of Maryland properly interpreted section 2(b) and, indeed, its decision comports with
the realities of competitive conditions present in the gasoline marketing
industry. It is clear that paragraph (d) of the Maryland statute as construed
by the court does not conflict with the section 2(b) defense. "Voluntary
allowances" means "only those price reductions offered to retail dealers to
enable the dealer to meet the lower price of a competing retaildealer"191; the
section 2(b) defense "is available only where the discriminatory price
reduction is to meet the equally low price offered to the same buyer by a
competing seller."''1 2 Thus, the section 2(b) defense is not available to a
supplier who grants a voluntary allowance, and the requirement that
allowances be uniform throughout the state does not conflict with the
limited Robinson-Patman "meeting competition" defense.
CONCLUSION

The Exxon decision was significant in several respects. In its opinion,
the Court of Appeals clearly reaffirmed the view that economic legislation
should be subjected to only the most minimal judicial scrutiny, particularly
where a serious problem calls for novel legislation. Moreover, the court
recognized that the state has a strong legitimate interest in preserving
competition within its borders; states need not always defer to the federal
government in antitrust matters. Although the energy shortage of 1973
affected the entire nation, some states, like Maryland, suffered greater
economic losses than others. With the possibility that shortages will
continue to occur, it is particularly appropriate that the states, rather than
the federal government, should formulate laws tailored to deal with those
effects of the oil shortage peculiar to their situations. In upholding the
Maryland statute, the Exxon court clearly considered the state's interest in
preserving a competitive gasoline market as justifying the incidental burden
the statute placed on interstate commerce. Hence, the Court of Appeals of
Maryland validated a significant piece of economic legislation that not only
equalizes within Maryland the impact of future shortages, but also serves as
189. See, e.g., Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (attempt by major oil
company to set retail prices through consignment arrangement held to be unlawful
vertical price fixing). Cf. MD. COM. LAw CODE ANN. §§ 11-301 to 11-308 (1975)
(providing increased statutory protection of independent gasoline retailers).
190. See, e.g., Bolick-Gillman Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 206 F. Supp. 151,
157-59 (D. Nev. 1961).
191. 279 Md. at 452, 370 A.2d at 1125 (emphasis in original).
192. Id. at 451-52, 370 A.2d at 1124. (emphasis in original).
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an example to other states anxious to control uncertain developments in the
presently unstable petroleum industry. Finally, the court's analysis of
section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act should dispel much of the
confusion that has developed concerning the scope of the Robinson-Patman
"meeting competition" defense. The court's analysis is both faithful to
antitrust policy and most clearly mandated by the language of the statute.
The opinion in Exxon also accords completely with the Supreme Court's
reasoning in Sun Oil. Moreover, by basing the analysis on the realities of
the gasoline retailing industry as well as on the scope of the statutory
language, the Court of Appeals of Maryland amply demonstrated that a
broader construction of the defense would in fact result in the type of
anticompetitive conditions that antitrust legislation seeks to avoid.

